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The role of regional organizations in managing protracted conflicts within and among Member 
States cannot be overemphasized.  This has been the case of the Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa, a region characterised by protracted conflict, 
instability and state failure as in the case of Somalia. Established in 1986 as Intergovernmental 
Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), the organization was re-established in 1996 
as IGAD with its mandate expanded to include regional peace and security. Adopting 
diplomacy of conflict management as an approach towards conflicts in the Horn of Africa, 
IGAD has visibly been involved in the continued search for peace in the embattled state of 
Somalia.  Political stability and sustainable peace in Somalia however remains elusive as new 
actors and interest in the conflict emerge. While acknowledging IGAD’s critical role towards 
political stability in Somalia and the larger Horn of Africa, I argue that IGAD lacks institutional 
capacity to sustainably resolve complex and protracted conflicts as in the case of Somalia, 
which calls for multiple approaches to conflict management than those provided for in the 
IGAD’s founding Agreement.  
 
Introduction  
For over two decades Somalia lacked an effective functional government. Continued 
anarchy and protracted violence has not only led to human suffering and misery among the 
Somali citizenry, but has spill over effects regionally and globally. Thousands of refugees have 
fled into the neighbouring states, proliferation of small arms remains rampant, and most 
recently, the scourge of international terrorism and piracy off the coast of Somalia have 
undermined efforts towards political restoration of the state of Somalia. The restructuring of 
IGADD into IGAD with a broadened mandate including conflict management brought hope 
for restoration of peace in Somalia and the larger Horn of Africa. IGAD embraced diplomacy 
of conflict management leading to the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government of 
Somalia (TFG) in 2004 (see for example Apuuli, 2015; Mwanika, 2015; Thompson, 2015). 
Though internationally recognized, TFG failed to attract legitimacy among the contending 
factions in Somalia.  Efforts by neighbouring states and the international community resulted 
to marginal gains making sustainable peace elusive. This paper examines the institutional 
structure of IGAD as established in its founding Agreement of 1996, hereinafter the 
Agreement, in the context of regional peace and security. The paper proceeds from the premise 
that IGAD lacks the institutional capacity effectively manage complex and protracted conflicts 
as the case of Somalia which calls for multiple approaches to conflict management than those 
provided for in the Agreement. 
 






IGAD: Evolution and Organizational Structure 
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was re-established in 1996. 
It succeeded the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) that had 
been in existence for barely a decade after its inception in 1986.  IGADD was founded not on 
the basis of political regional integration, but on the need to monitor and coordinate 
environmental protection and development in the Horn of Africa region, with the aim of 
ensuring food security in the drought prone region (IGAD, 1996; Healy, 2011). The initial 
membership of IGADD, later IGAD comprised of Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia 
and Sudan, while Eritrea was admitted into the organization soon after its independence as the 
seventh Member State in 1993 (IGAD, 1996). In 2011 South Sudan was admitted as the 
youngest member of IGAD.  
IGAD is founded on a set of principles as stipulated in Article 6 (a) of the Agreement. 
These are; sovereign equality, non-interference on internal affairs, peaceful settlements of inter 
and intra-state conflicts, and maintenance of regional peace and security. Member States are 
also committed to mutual and equitable sharing of any benefits from their cooperation as per 
the Agreement, and to ensure recognition, promotion and protection of human rights as 
provided in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (IGAD, 1996). The principles 
of IGAD are anchored on core values and purposes of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), the African Union (AU) and the United Nation (UN), particularly on sovereign 
equality, and peaceful settlement of conflicts (UN, 1945; OAU, 1963; AU, 2000). Article 7 of 
the IGAD Agreement, identifies the organizational objectives including but not limited to; 
creation of enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment, 
achievement of regional food security and combating drought, and, promotion of peace and 
regional stability through conflict prevention, and resolution of inter and intrastate conflicts 
among Member States (IGAD, 1996).  Acting within its organizational principles and 
objectives, IGAD remains instrumental in conflict management towards regional peace and 
security in the Horn of Africa. 
Towards efficiency and effective delivery of its mandate, IGAD has an established 
working and decision making structure as provided in Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the 
Agreement. At the very top of the organizational structure is the Assembly of the Heads of 
States and Government, whose principle responsibility is to make policy, control and direct the 
function of the organization. The Council of Ministers comprising of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs from Member States is the immediate level of decision making from that of the 
Assembly, and is charged with advisory role to the Assembly as well as monitoring the 
functioning of the organization through the Secretariat. The other two organs are the 
Committee of Ambassadors and the Secretariat whose are respectively charged with the 
advisory role to the Executive Secretary and implementation of decisions by the Assembly and 
the Council (IGAD, 1996). The adoption of the Conflict Early Warning and Response 
Mechanism (CEWARN) Protocol in 2002, provided for the establishment of the Committee of 
Permanent Secretaries whose focus is on regional peace and conflict as provided in Article 9 
of the Protocol (IGAD, 2002).  Apart from the decision making organs, IGAD has constituted 
specialized agencies that include the CEWARN, the IGAD Women Desk, IGAD Capacity 
Building Against Terrorism (ICPAT), IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre for 
Monitoring and Forecasting, and IGAD Parliamentary Union (IGAD, 2002; 2007; 
Weldesellasie, 2011).  
Informed by one of its founding principles, that of peaceful settlement of inter and 
intrastate conflicts, and with the aim of promoting peace and stability in the conflict prone Horn 






of Africa region, IGAD has been involved in the management of the intrastate conflicts in the 
region.   Notably, IGAD remained visible in the management of the Sudan that resulted to the 
establishment of the Republic of South Sudan in 2011. In the recent past, IGAD has been 
engaged in negotiating the South Sudan Conflict that has been ongoing since 2013 (see Apuuli, 
2015). The focus of this paper in not on South Sudan but rather on IGAD’s efforts in the 
management of the Somali conflict as discussed in the subsequent sections.  
 
Understanding the Somalia Conflict  
For over two decades since the ouster of Siad Barre in 1991 Somalia remained without 
a functional central government. During this period, Somalia was described as one of the most 
failed and dangerous state in the world (Fergusson, 2013). None of the belligerent factions was 
politically adequate to form a legitimate government that was inclusive enough to serve the 
interests of the many clan divisions that characterise the Somali population (Moller, 2009). 
Continued lawlessness witnessed the rise of clan associated militias and warlords with control 
of most regions in the country (Vinci, 2006). Lack of legitimate government institutions 
resulted to failure of externally supported peace initiatives, as warlords and clan factions raised 
claims of exclusion leading to abandonment of reconciliatory negotiations (Menkhaus, 2010; 
Thompson, 2015; Adar, 2006; Lewis, 2002). The continued anarchy left the Somalia citizenry 
psychologically tortured and faced with immense social and economic hardship (Abdullahi, 
2014).  
Political dictatorship by President Siad Barre is identified as one of the root causes 
leading to his ouster and the subsequent disintegration of Somalia (Adar, 2006; Yoh, 2006). 
Somalia’s conflict is also associated with the social structure in which the clan groupings define 
the politics and any other aspect of the state (Thompson, 2015; Demeke, 2014). However, Elmi 
and Barise (2006) have attempted to deconstruct clannism as one of the main causes of the 
Somalia conflict. They argue that clan identities are not static but are used depending on 
convenience of the political elites. Citing Siad Barre’s Presidency and the strategic use of his 
clan to consolidate power and to marginalise the rest of the population, Elmi and Barise (2006) 
observe that the Somalia conflict is located in the struggle for resources and control of state 
power as opposed to clan identities.  
Apart from the domestic factors, the Somalia conflict has been associated with systemic 
factors. At the height of the Cold War Somalia was perceived as very strategic by the two 
competing western blocks. For instance, after the United States broke its diplomatic ties with 
Ethiopia in 1977, its focus was redirected to wooing Somalia as a strategic partner including 
provision of arms (Iyob and Keller, 2006). Somalia was significantly affected by availability 
of arms, as internal conflict intensified leading to the ouster of Siad Barre, and the subsequent 
disintegration of the central government (Iyob and Keller, 2006). What is worth noting is that 
the prolonged violence was blamed on presence of such arms and lack of a central government 
that could have facilitated a meaningful process of disarmament. In addition, lack of a 
legitimate government responsible for the Somalia territory, created what is commonly viewed 
as ungoverned spaces that are conveniently used by terror related groups such as the Al 
Shabaab as their breeding ground (Mogire and Agade, 2011).  
Effects of the Somalia conflicts are not only domestically felt, but are experienced in 
regional and global arenas. Having been the epicentre of the Horn of Africa conflict system, 
the Somalia conflict has seen a huge number of refugees hosted in the neighbouring states 






across the region (Anderson and Mcknight, 2014; Fergusson, 2013).  For example, as at 2015, 
Kenya was hosting over half a million of the Somali refugees (UNHR, 2016). Somali refugees 
especially those living the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, have been associated with 
challenges relating to environmental degradation, and recently, they have been linked to the 
planning and execution of terrorists attacks in Kenya (Kaburu, 2017; Mwanika, 2015; Lindley, 
2011).  Proliferation of small arms in the Horn of Africa region has also been associated with 
the prolonged lawlessness in Somalia. With long and porous borders characterised by weak 
border security, small arms have found their way into the cities in the region such as Nairobi 
(Asamoah, 2015). Furthermore, being a coastal state, Somalia has national and international 
obligation to protect its territorial waters. Unfortunately, due to lack of a stable government in 
place, piracy off the coast of Somalia has been on the rise since 2006, with significant effects 
on both regional and global trade (Kaburu; 2017; Wambua, 2012; Gathii, 2010; Moller, 2011).  
Since the early years of the civil war, the Somalia conflict has attracted a lot of interests 
from the international community and the neighbouring states. Both bilateral and multilateral 
efforts have been initiated aimed at restoring order in Somalia. The initiatives range from 
humanitarian assistance, diplomacy of conflict management and military enforcement among 
others. IGAD as the main sub-regional organization has taken a lead role in the management 
of the Somalia conflict. Using various approaches within the provisions of the founding 
Agreement, IGAD has remained committed to the restoration of Somalia amidst institutional 
challenges as discussion in the next section of this paper.  
 
IGAD and the Management of the Somalia Conflict  
IGAD’s commitment towards restoration of order in Somalia cannot be 
overemphasized. It is however important to note that attempts to manage the conflict by the 
international community dates back in 1992 when the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM-I) was launched. Through UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 751, 767 and 
775 UNOSOM-I was initiated as the first humanitarian intervention, with a narrow mandate of 
establishing humanitarian corridors and peace zones to facilitate distribution of aid to the 
affected population (UNSC, 1992). With a delay in its launch and minimal resources availed, 
the intervention not only failed to achieve its very narrow mandate, but was blamed for 
aggravating the problem by granting warlords a sense of legitimacy that they hardly deserved 
(Moller, 2011; Menkhaus, 2010). In response, the UNSC through Resolution 814 launched 
UNOSOM-II with an expanded mandate, which overlapped with a unilateral mission by United 
States intervention, United Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) (UNSC, 1993). The two 
interventions failed to restore peace, and their withdrawal in 1995 left Somalia more devastated 
than it had been prior the interventions (Moller, 2011). Affected by the continued lawlessness 
in Somalia, the neighbouring states (most of whom are IGAD Member States) were forced to 
initiate bilateral and multilateral peace efforts aimed at stabilizing Somalia and the region.  
The exit of the UN supported peacekeepers from Somalia came at a time when IGADD 
Member States had resolved to revitalize the sub-regional body into IGAD with an expanded 
mandate to include that of maintaining peace and security in the region. Such a move was 
timely as IGAD banner was used by Member States to initiate peace processes in Somalia, as 
opposed to its predecessor IGADD whose founding mandate did not include that of regional 
politics, peace and security (see the founding Agreement of IGAD, 1996). The focus of state 
building in Somalia was critical for the IGAD Member States to enhance formalised interaction 
of Somalia in International Relations. In addition, the Somali citizenry needed formal 






institutions of government through which their needs could be addressed, particularly those 
that had been forced into refugee status in the neighbouring states (Moller, 2011). Furthermore, 
political stability and presence of a legitimate central government in Somalia was likely to 
counter international terrorism in the region by addressing issues relating to ungoverned spaces 
that are perceived as favourable hind outs, breeding grounds and transit areas for the terrorist 
groups (Bradbury and Kleinman, 2010). 
IGAD acted in support of bilateral initiatives by neighbouring states towards 
stabilization of Somalia. However, in 2002 IGAD undertook an institutionalised approach 
towards the Somali conflict by initiating a mediation peace process in the Kenyan town of 
Eldoret (Healy, 2009). As opposed to the previous initiatives like the Arta and Sodere peace 
processes that were characterised by exclusion of some factions of leadership in Somalia, the 
2002-2004 was perceived as more inclusive taking cognisance of not only the elders 
representing various clans, but also the warlords whose significant control in various parts of 
Somalia was acknowledged (Terlinden, 2004; Mwanika, 2013). After close to two years of the 
mediation process, a draft Transitional Federal Charter was concluded establishing Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) and Transitional Federal Parliament in 2004 (Kamudhayi, 2011). 
The structure of the transitional government was clearly stipulated in the TFG Charter that was 
conceived as the supreme law of Somalia. For instance, Article 11 of the Charter provided for 
a decentralised system of government comprising of a Transitional Federal Government, State 
Governments (based on free will), regional administrations and district level governance (TFG, 
2004). 
 The establishment of such a governance structure for Somalia was viewed as a 
significant milestone by IGAD towards the ultimate stability in Somalia and the Horn of Africa 
region. TFG gained international recognition and rekindled hopes of political stability, and a 
new beginning towards state building after years of anarchy and lawlessness. Such hopes were 
however threatened by the inability of the newly formed TFG to relocate from Nairobi and 
establish its operational base in the Mogadishu as the capital city of Somalia (Healy, 2009, 
2011). Although insecurity was cited as one of the challenges that the TFG was grappling with, 
claims of exclusion and the external character of the mediation process were also viewed as 
contributing factors (Menkhaus, 2010). Such claims compromised on the legitimacy of TFG, 
and its ability to assert authority in the entire territory of Somalia.  
Determined to restore a central government and a sense of normalcy in Somalia, IGAD 
acknowledged the need to provide security in support of the TFG. Through the Assembly of 
the Heads of State and Government, IGAD made a decision to deploy a peace support mission 
in Somalia (IGASOM), and sought approval and financial support of the same from the African 
Union (IGAD, 2005). The request was approved the Assembly of the AU, who acknowledged 
the need for the peace support mission as a means of ensuring the relocation of the TFG to 
from Nairobi to Somalia, and to safeguard a sustained implementation of the outcomes of the 
concluded mediation process (AU, 2005). To appease the Somali parliamentarians who were 
opposed to the deployment of Ethiopian troops, frontline states including Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Djibouti were exempted from contributing forces to IGASOM, leaving Uganda and Sudan to 
contribute the troops towards the mission (IGAD, 2005a; Murithi, 2009). Unfortunately, 
IGASOM was not operationalised not only due lack of funding and political will from member 
states, but its founding Agreement did not provide an institutional mechanism for such a 
mission (IGAD, 1996; Murithi, 2009).  
The failure of IGAD to provide support means for relocating TFG from Nairobi to 
Mogadishu, informed the new government’s decision to seek military protection from the 






Ethiopian government which facilitated its relocation to Baidoa and later to Mogadishu 
(Moller, 2011). The move further eroded TFG’s marginal legitimacy as it was regarded an 
Ethiopian project that was out to serve their interests (Menkhaus, 2010). Despite its marginal 
legitimacy among the various factions, and failure to assert its authority nationally, IGAD held 
onto TFG as the only legitimate government of Somalia, a position that hampered any form of 
mediation between the Union for Islamic Courts (UIC) and TFG (Healy, 2009; Murithi, 2009). 
The attempt by the UN Security Council through Resolution 1775 to have IGAD and AU carry 
out military training for Somalia was also challenged by an already existing UN military 
embargo that had not been lifted (Murithi, 2009).  
With TFG unable to effectively assert its authority, Somalia disintegrated further 
threatening regional and global security as the ungoverned spaces became safe havens for 
breeding international terrorism remained on the rise (Fergusson, 2013; Bradbury and 
Kleinman, 2010). Furthermore, the emergence of self-proclaimed terror related group the Al 
Shabaab, increased piracy off the coast of Somalia, and the ever rising number of refugees in 
search for safety, are clear indicators of the inadequacy of IGAD to restore a semblance 
normalcy and sustained peace in Somalia (Anderson and Mcknight, 2014, Healy, 2011; Gathii, 
2010; Kaburu, 2017). In an attempt to counter a possible move by terrorist groups to transform 
the of ungoverned spaces into breeding grounds for international terrorism, the African Union, 
through the UN Security Council Resolution 1772 deployed a peace enforcement mission in 
Somalia, AMISOM (UNSC, 2007). The deployment of AMISOM served as an indicator of 
IGAD’s institutional inability to address the challenges preventing the TFG from establishing 
its presence and legitimate authority in Somalia. Thus, while acknowledging IGAD’s 
milestones towards stabilizing Somalia, there are pertinent concerns about its institutional 
capacity to conclusively manage such a complex conflict, and ensure restoration of the state of 
Somalia, and by implication stability in the Horn of Africa.  
 
IGAD Institutional Weaknesses  
IGAD’s decimal success towards political stabilization of Somalia has been associated 
with institutional weakness among other socio-political factors. From its inception IGAD was 
short of diverse mechanisms of dealing with complex inter and intrastate conflicts at least 
according to the provisions of its founding Agreement. Article 7(g) of the Agreement provides 
that maintenance of regional peace and stability shall be sought by creation of mechanisms for 
prevention, management and resolution of conflict through dialogue (IGAD, 1996). It can 
therefore be argued that the failure to operationalise IGASOM as had been agreed upon in 
2005, was not only due to scarcity of financial and human resource, but it lacked legal 
institutional backing from the Agreement.  
Pacific methods to conflict management such as negotiation and mediation which are 
institutionally preferred by IGAD are challenged by the fact the Somalia conflict is 
characterised by amorphous groups, who are consistently transforming in terms of actors and 
interests in the conflict. According to Vinci (2006), the Somalia conflict is characterised by 
militia groups that are different in terms of formation goals and clan affiliations. Notably due 
to the prolonged lawlessness, the groups have continually mutated and transformed in terms of 
actors and goals, challenging any meaningful form of negotiation.  On this basis, Member 
States such as Ethiopia and Kenya who have historical border conflicts with Somalia, have 
occasionally undertaken unilateral military initiatives to protect their national interests, which 
they presume as threatened by the continued anarchy, and the internal dynamics of the Somalia 






conflict (Thompson, 2015; Menkhaus, 2010; Kenya Defence Forces, 2014; Kaburu, 2017). For 
instance, in 2006 Ethiopia deployed its military in Somalia with the aim of dislodging the UIC, 
while Kenya had its unilateral military engagement in pursuit of the Al Shabaab in 2011 (Healy, 
2011, Anderson and McKnight, 2014). Both states justified their military engagement using 
the provisions of self-defence as per Article 51of the UN Charter, and acting on invitation of a 
legitimate government, TFG (Kenya Defence Forces, 2014; Yihdego, 2007). The inability to 
prevent such unilateral military engagements by some Member States on a collapsed state such 
as Somalia, implies that IGAD is institutionally incapable of controlling actions by its members 
with regard to conflicts in the region. This not only weakens its posture as a regional body, but 
also undermines its credibility as an organization.  
Organizational decision making is another institutional limitation facing IGAD. 
Decisions within IGAD are based on consensus by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government as per Article 9 (4) of the IGAD Agreement (IGAD, 1996). Considering that 
relations among the Member States are characterised by suspicion and rivalry as noted earlier 
in this article, I argue that it is unlikely that member state would be willing to consent on certain 
initiatives such a military enforcement, even though it is presumed to be the most appropriate. 
The failure of the IGASOM mission in Somalia can be attributed to such a weakness in the 
decision making structure of IGAD. 
Additionally, IGAD lacks an organizational judicial institution to settle disputes among 
Member States and to deal with conflicts that may require such an approach. As per Article 7 
(g) of the IGAD Agreement management of conflicts is based on political dialogue (IGAD, 
1996). Notably though, the Somalia conflict has mutated in terms of actors, issues and interest, 
occasionally calling for a different approach including judicial processes. For example, one of 
the recent dynamic associated with the Somalia conflict is the increased cases of piracy off the 
coast of Somalia that has consequently threatened both regional and global trade (see for 
example Wambua, 2012, Kontorovich, 2010; Pham, 2010). Being a coastal State, and lacking 
an effective central government, Somalia has been incapable of exercising its sovereign rights 
of protecting its territorial waters and its Exclusive Economic Zone as provided by UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (UN, 1982). The challenge is that IGAD lacks 
a standing naval force to counter the increasing cases of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and 
no judicial mechanism to prosecute the perpetrators of acts of piracy among other atrocities 
including acts of terrorism (see IGAD Agreement, 1996). Consequently, in an effort to secure 
their geostrategic and geopolitical interests from the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia, 
a state like Kenya entered into bilateral agreements with Western states such as the United 
States and Regional Organizations such as the European Union to prosecute Somali pirates 
(Gathii, 2010, Wambua, 2012). 
Although IGAD as an organization possess a legal personality, and has established 
specialised agencies in line with its founding objectives, it exercises extremely limited capacity 
and powers, in that all the specialised agencies are merely in their infancy stage (Weldesellasie, 
2011; Healy; 2011). I note that the envisioned specialised institutions such as IGAD Business 
Forum, IGAD-Civil Society Organizations and Non- Governmental Organizations Forum, and 
IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union, if operationalised can impact significantly towards 
establishing sustainable peace in the failed state of Somalia. While CEWARN is perceived as 
one of the most elaborate institution established by IGAD, it is faced with the challenge of 
effectively identifying possible conflicts and addressing them in early stages. This is due to the 
strained relations among Member States that impedes sharing of crucial information through 






the established National conflict early warning mechanism (CEWERUs) that operate in each 
of the Member States (Weldesellie, 2011).  
Geopolitically and earlier noted in this paper, some IGAD Member States have had 
historical border conflicts with Somalia emanating from their independence in the early 1960’s 
(Thompson, 2015; Lewis, 2002, Adar, 2006; 1994). Adopting the principle of uti possidentis1 
by OAU, in which states were required to inherit existing borders of the colonial entity as they 
were at independence, did not solve the problems particularly with Somalia (OAU, 1964). 
Somalia maintained the very ideology of establishing a Greater Somalia, a position that led to 
persistent border conflicts with Kenya and Ethiopia, occasionally leading to interstate wars, as 
was the case of the Shifta war and the Ogaden war (Adar, 1994; Thompson, 2015; Lewis, 
2002). Such strained relations hinder efficiency in sharing of adequate and credible information 
as a prerequisite for a successful implementation of CERWARN. 
Suspicion and rivalry among Member States of IGAD are blamed for the continued 
internationalization of internal conflicts as states focus on alliance formation and power play, 
by providing support to liberation movements and other form of opposition groups in the 
neighbouring states (Adar, 2010; Healy, 2009). For instance, Adar (2010) notes that as Uganda 
made deliberates efforts to support Sudan People’s Liberation Movement /Army (SPLM/A), 
Sudan funded the Lord’s Resistant Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda. For the Somali case, 
IGAD Member States like Ethiopia, Eritrea and even Kenya have supported particular factional 
warlords and clans in pursuit of their own geopolitical and geostrategic interests (Menkahus, 
2010; 2009; Healy, 2011).  Notably, in the early stages of the Somalia conflict, IGAD Member 
States sabotaged each other’s unilateral peace initiatives towards Somalia.  For example, 
Kenya’s unilateral attempt 1996 was undermined by Ethiopia’s Sodere initiative that was 
perceived as being more inclusive (Menkahaus, 2010, Mwanika, 2015; Healy, 2011)). Such 
political suspicion and mistrust among member states are equally to blame for the marginal 
achievements of IGAD in restoring political stability in Somalia. 
Conclusion 
This article has examined the role of IGAD in managing regional conflict with a 
particular focus on Somalia. To this end, the article underscores the re-establishment of IGAD 
and its expanded mandate of maintaining peace and security in the Horn of Africa, as a 
foundation for IGAD’s continued engagement in the Somalia crisis among other conflicts in 
the region. Between 2002 and 2004 IGAD undertook an institutionalised approach and 
successfully mediated the Somalia conflict calumniating with the establishment of the TFG 
which enjoyed international recognition. Notably though, peace in Somalia remains elusive, 
with internal dynamics consistently transforming the conflict in terms of actors and interests. 
The emergence of international terrorism and piracy off the coast of Somalia has further 
complicated the situation calling for a change in conflict management mechanisms, from the 
previously preferred soft power to adoption of hard power, as neighbouring states seek to 
protect their geopolitical interest that they consider threatened. Such observations 
notwithstanding, I have argued that as an organization, IGAD lacks the institutional capacity 
to conclusively manage complex conflicts as in the case of Somalia, towards restoration of 
sustainable peace and political stability in the larger Horn of Africa region. I note that lack of 
                                                          
1 Uti possidetis juris in relation to Africa, is a principle which means the right of the newly independent sovereign 
states to retain their borders as acquired at the time of independence. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
adopted this principle during its Summit in 1964, Cairo, Egypt. 
 






institutional support for alternative mechanisms to that of political dialogue as provided in the 
IGAD Agreement, has seen the organization unable to effectively respond to cases of 
international terrorism and piracy off the coast of Somalia. Continued rivalry and mistrust 
among member states, lack of resources, and adoption of consensus as the means of decision 
making further undermines IGAD’s institutional capacity to effectively carry out its 
organizational mandate.  
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